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  INTRODUCTION   
States increasingly are raising financing indirectly through 
special-purpose entities (SPEs), variously referred to as author-
ities, special authorities, or public authorities.1 Some states, 
such as New York, New Jersey, and Virginia, issue relatively 
few general obligation bonds,2
[A] state such as New York, for example, with one of the highest per-
capita debt burdens in the nation, owes only $3.5 billion in “general 
obligation” debt. New York owes the remainder of its $78.4 billion in 
debt through hundreds of special “authorities,” including the Transi-
tional Finance Authority, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the 
Dormitory Authority, and others.
 obtaining most of their financing 
through bonds issued by state SPEs: 
3
Virtually all states obtain at least a portion of their public fi-
nancing through state SPEs.
 
4
 
 1. See, e.g., Lynn Wilson & Clayton Eichelberger, New York State Public 
Authority Reform: Where We Have Come from and Where We Need to Go, 
GOV’T L. & POL’Y J., Fall 2009, at 15, 15. Perhaps the nation’s most well-
known example of a state SPE is the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey, whose operations include the tunnels and bridges between New York 
and New Jersey, the PATH rail system, and the JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark 
airports. See infra note 
  
20 and accompanying text.  
 2. These are the traditional debt securities issued by states, payment of 
which is backed directly by a state’s full faith and credit and taxing power. 
General Obligation Bond (G.O. Bond), MUN. SECS. RULEMAKING BOARD, 
http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/glossary/view_def.asp?param= 
GENERALOBLIGATIONBOND (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
 3. Nicole Gelinas, “State and Municipal Debt: The Coming Crisis?”, PUB. 
SECTOR INC. (Feb. 7, 2011, 8:43 AM), http://www.publicsectorinc.com/psi_ 
articles/2011/02/state-and-municipal-debt-the-coming-crisis.html; see also 
CLAIRE G. COHEN, FITCH RATINGS, STATE DEBT AND EXPOSURE TO DEBT-LIKE 
COMMITMENTS 2 (2006) (observing that “New York, New Jersey, and Virginia 
finance almost exclusively through authorities”). 
 4. Rhonda Riherd Trautman, The Impact of State Debt Management on 
Debt Activity, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 1995, at 33, 35 tbl.1, 38 tbl.2; 
see also JERRY MITCHELL, THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT WITH GOVERNMENT 
CORPORATIONS 15 (1999) (“At the subnational level, government corporations 
can be found in every state and most localities.”); Gail Radford, From Munici-
pal Socialism to Public Authorities: Institutional Factors in the Shaping of 
American Public Enterprise, 90 J. AM. HIST. 863, 867 (2003) (“All Americans 
now live within overlapping layers of quasi-governmental units responsible for 
public services . . . .”).  
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Notwithstanding their long history and increasingly wide-
spread use, relatively little is known about state SPEs.5 Origi-
nally modeled on the Port Authority of London,6 state SPEs 
were first used in the United States in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.7 They initially were seen as a way to bypass various re-
strictions that hampered traditional government agencies, no-
tably constitutional debt limits and jurisdictional limitations.8 
In recent years, however, the use of state SPEs increasingly 
has been paralleling the use of special-purpose entities in cor-
porate finance (hereinafter, corporate SPEs) as a means of rais-
ing “off-balance-sheet” financing.9
 
 5. Jonathan Rosenbloom, Can a Private Corporate Analysis of Public Au-
thority Administration Lead to Democracy?, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 851, 870 
(2005–2006) (“Despite an increase in the number of public authorities, the ser-
vices they render and the debt they issue, public authorities remain a fairly 
unstudied matter.”). The scholarship on state SPEs is not only sparse but also 
decades old. See, e.g., William T. R. Fox & Annette Baker Fox, Municipal Gov-
ernment and Special-Purpose Authorities, 207 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 176 (1940); Peter R. Nehemkis, Jr., The Public Authority: Some Legal and 
Practical Aspects, 47 YALE L.J. 14 (1937); Jerome Shestack, The Public Au-
thority, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1957).  
 This is a financing in which 
 6. Nehemkis, supra note 5, at 14 n.2. 
 7. Shestack, supra note 5, at 556. 
 8. See Fox & Fox, supra note 5, at 178 (explaining that it was much easi-
er to create an SPE than to remove a constitutional debt limit, and noting that 
SPEs were in part created to solve jurisdictional issues that arose because “po-
litical boundaries . . . never coincide with social and economic boundaries”); see 
also GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (GASB), STATEMENT NO. 
14: THE FINANCIAL REPORTING ENTITY ¶¶ 5–7 (1991) (noting that separate 
organizations are sometimes created to overcome state constitutional, statuto-
ry, or charter obstacles or to provide a level of autonomy not permitted by the 
“general government’s organizational framework”). These paragraphs are not 
impacted by GASB Statement No. 61’s amendments to Statement No. 14. For 
a comparison of the amendments to the original text, see GASB, EXPOSURE 
DRAFT, THE FINANCIAL REPORTING ENTITY: AN AMENDMENT OF GASB 
STATEMENTS NO. 14 AND NO. 34 ¶¶ 24–53 (2010). 
 9. For an introduction to corporate SPEs, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron 
and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1309 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Special Purpose Entities in 
Corporate Structures]. Corporate finance that involves the use of corporate 
SPEs is often referred to as structured finance. See id. at 1314. Structured fi-
nance in which corporate SPEs issue securities to investors and use the pro-
ceeds to purchase financial assets, collections on which are used to repay the 
securities, is referred to as securitization. See Steven L. Schwarcz, What Is Se-
curitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996670.  
  
372 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:369 
 
the repayment obligation of the SPE is not required to be dis-
closed as a liability on the balance sheet of the SPE’s creator.10
This trend in the use of state SPEs is troubling. By reduc-
ing financial transparency, off-balance-sheet financing under-
mines financial integrity and creates a potential for abuse—
illustrated in the corporate context, for example, by Enron’s use 
of SPEs for balance-sheet manipulation.
 
11 Off-balance-sheet fi-
nancing can even trigger systemic consequences.12 Its use by 
corporate SPEs is seen, for example, as a contributing cause of 
the 2008 financial crisis.13 The lack of transparency can also 
have other serious consequences, such as preventing state gen-
eral obligation bonds from being priced correctly based on state 
fiscal risk.14
This Article examines state SPEs and their functions, com-
paring them to corporate SPEs. Although the use of state SPEs 
is not inherently wrongful,
  
15
 
 10. See Schwarcz, Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, supra 
note 
 they have a greater potential to be 
9, at 1301, 1315 (describing the relationship between an SPE and its cre-
ator and explaining its “use[] to keep debt off a company’s balance sheet”). 
 11. Id. at 1309–12. 
 12. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (comparing systemic 
risk resulting from corporate SPE and state SPE use); cf. Iman Anabtawi & 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1359 (2011) (observing that En-
ron’s use of SPEs could have triggered a systemic financial crisis if Enron’s 
viability had more closely correlated with the viability of other financial insti-
tutions).  
 13. See, e.g., JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., THE U.S. HOUSING BUB-
BLE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: VULNERABILITIES OF THE ALTERNA-
TIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 5, 16–17 (2008), available at http://www.jec.senate 
.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b54b89ff-649e-4e45-93f0 
-395d1f507762; MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34412, AVERTING 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 2–5 (2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/103688.pdf; MARTIN NEIL BAILY ET AL., INITIATIVE ON BUS. & 
PUB. POLICY AT BROOKINGS, THE ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 27–29 
(2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/ 
2008/11/origin%20crisis%20baily%20litan/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan; Niall 
Ferguson, Wall Street Lays Another Egg, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2008, at 190, 198–
200; What Went Wrong, ECONOMIST (Mar. 19, 2008), http://www.economist 
.com/node/10881318. 
 14. To the extent investors in state general obligation bonds are unaware 
of de facto guaranteed state SPE debt (and of the fiscal impact of those de fac-
to guarantees on the state), those bonds would almost certainly be mispriced. 
 15. See Schwarcz, Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, supra 
note 9, at 1314 (beginning an inquiry into differentiating legitimate and ille-
gitimate uses of corporate SPEs). In the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the 
problem was not the use of corporate SPEs, per se. Rather, non-traditional as-
set-backed securities, collateralized debt obligation (ABS CDO) securitization 
transactions, which relied on corporate SPEs, were structured in a way that 
  
2012] STATE SPECIAL-PURPOSE ENTITIES 373 
 
abused in public finance than in corporate finance. Several fac-
tors contribute to this aggravated potential. Reduced transpar-
ency of state SPEs, like corporate SPEs, can undermine finan-
cial integrity. Unlike corporate SPEs, however, reduced 
transparency of state SPEs can also undermine constitutional 
and democratic legitimacy.16 Moreover, state SPEs are more 
likely to be misused than corporate SPEs because public fi-
nance is more susceptible than corporate finance to monitoring 
failures.17
 
even relatively small errors in cash flow projections could cause defaults and 
downgradings. When these errors occurred, the resulting defaults and 
downgradings panicked investors, who started avoiding the debt markets, in 
turn causing the price of debt securities to fall, which in turn (because of 
mark-to-market accounting) caused market prices to plummet further down-
ward in a death spiral. The lack of debt financing meant that companies could 
no longer grow—and in some cases, even survive—affecting the real economy 
and, at least in part, contributing to the financial crisis. See The State of Secu-
ritization Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Secs., Ins., & Inv. of the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 33–34 (2011) (state-
ment of Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law and Business, 
Duke University School of Law) [hereinafter Testimony of Schwarcz], availa-
ble at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg70772/pdf/CHRG-112shrg70772 
.pdf; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from 
the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376 (2008) (explain-
ing the interrelated nature of securities such as ABS CDO transactions and 
SPEs). 
 
 16. Cf. Carolyn Bourdeaux, A Question of Genesis: An Analysis of the De-
terminants of Public Authorities, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 441, 442 
(2005) (observing that state SPEs are used to “escape [state] debt limitations 
and possibly to circumvent tax and expenditure limitations”); Rosenbloom, su-
pra note 5, at 871, 900 (noting the “ability of public authorities to evade many 
of the good governance checks applicable to public agencies such as oversight 
and accountability” and proposing a unified regional overseer and setter of pol-
icy for public services provided by state SPEs). 
 17. Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 898–99 (noting that state SPEs lack key 
regulatory features present in corporate SPEs—such as shareholders and 
market forces—resulting in diminished oversight and increased potential for 
abuse and corruption). This Article does not engage the question of federal 
government use of SPEs, which is much more limited than state government 
use of SPEs. For example, in order to stabilize and bring liquidity back to the 
commercial paper markets during the 2008 financial crisis, the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) created, among other facilities, the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to operate as a lender of last re-
sort for those markets. Because the Fed traditionally used its lender-of-last-
resort powers under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to only make 
loans to banks, it structured the CPFF as a series of Fed loans to State Street 
Bank and Trust Company, which then made back-to-back loans to a newly-
created special-purpose entity, CPFF LLC. CPFF LLC used the back-to-back 
loan proceeds to purchase commercial paper from corporations and other 
commercial paper issuers. Tobias Adrian, et al., The Federal Reserve’s Com-
mercial Paper Funding Facility, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., May 2011, at 25, 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a taxono-
my of state SPEs, explaining their distinguishing characteris-
tics. Part II then examines the potential illegitimacies of state 
SPEs, focusing on their use to remove transparency from public 
financing. Part III analyzes how regulation should control the-
se potential illegitimacies, arguing that any regulatory frame-
work should embrace at least four overarching organizing prin-
ciples: improving transparency of state SPE debt, improving 
monitoring of state SPE debt, limiting state SPE debt, and im-
proving state SPE governance. Part III also demonstrates how 
a Model Public Authorities Oversight Law18
I.  STATE SPE TAXONOMY   
 incorporating these 
principles could be applied to improve state SPE governance 
and public finance.  
One must first understand state SPEs in order to analyze 
them. Although there are “many conflicting definitions of what 
[state SPEs] are,”19
A. ENGAGING IN INTERSTATE FUNCTIONS 
 the discussion below highlights their most 
important characteristics. These characteristics include engag-
ing in interstate government operations and running programs 
as an integral part of state government. They also include, less 
benignly, avoiding constitutional debt limits, avoiding federal 
taxes, and reducing state financial transparency. 
Some state SPEs are created by interstate agreement to 
address governmental functions crossing state lines. Indeed, 
one of the most well-known state SPEs is the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey, which operates “America’s busiest 
airport system [JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark airports], marine 
terminals and ports, the PATH rail transit system, six tunnels 
and bridges between New York and New Jersey, the Port Au-
thority Bus Terminal in Manhattan, and the World Trade Cen-
 
30–31. For a thoughtful introduction to the federal government’s use of SPEs, 
see Cheryl D. Block, Congress and Accounting Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the 
Kettle Black?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 365, 435–42 (2003). This Article also does not 
directly engage the question of municipal government use of SPEs. But cf. 
Model Pub. Auth. Oversight Law, infra app. I (embodying a regulatory frame-
work that in principle could also be applied to SPEs established by municipali-
ties or other government units). 
 18. See infra app. I (proposing a Model Public Authorities Oversight Law). 
 19. Howard Frant, Reconsidering the Determinants of Public Authority 
Use, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 571, 575 (1997). 
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ter.”20 State SPEs created by interstate agreement are general-
ly viewed with approval.21 Paradoxically, however, they are 
“fairly unusual.”22
B. RUNNING STATE PROGRAMS AS ENTERPRISES 
  
Some state SPEs are created as “enterprises” to run state 
programs as an integral part of state government.23 These types 
of state SPEs typically finance their operations by issuing rev-
enue bonds (also called revenue debt), repayable solely from the 
profits of the enterprise.24 Investors in those bonds therefore 
take the risk that the enterprise will be insufficiently profitable 
to repay them. They have no legal recourse to the state’s gen-
eral funds or tax revenues, and thus the bonds “are not consid-
ered state debt.”25
C. AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITS 
 The state thereby allocates risks associated 
with the enterprise to investors willing to take that risk, pre-
sumably for a higher interest rate on the bonds.  
State SPEs are sometimes created specifically to avoid 
state constitutional debt limits.26 Most state constitutions, “as a 
result of difficulties in one period or another, place some form 
of restriction on the creation of legal debt, commonly the need 
either for voter approval or passage of a constitutional amend-
ment.”27
 
 20. See Overview of Facilities and Services, PORT AUTHORITY OF N.Y. & 
N.J., http://www.panynj.gov/about/facilities-services.html (last visited Oct. 27, 
2012).  
 States can avoid these debt limits (and the public ref-
 21. Shestack, supra note 5, at 569 (observing that the “need for [state 
SPEs] appears greatest on the bi-state or regional level as a means of handling 
problems that cross jurisdictional lines”); cf. Frant, supra note 19, at 588 (dis-
cussing that it “seems plausible that authorities are used because they have 
desirable organizational properties in certain situations,” as suggested by po-
litical-economy theories).  
 22. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, Partner and Chair of the 
Public Finance Department, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (May 27, 
2011).  
 23. Id. (referencing the California Department of Water Resources as an 
example of a state enterprise SPE). State enterprise SPEs are sometimes also 
justified on the basis that government “should mimic what a private market in 
analogous goods would produce,” following the Tieboutian model of govern-
ment-as-firm. Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 
885 (2012).  
 24. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See GASB STATEMENT NO. 14, supra note 8, ¶ 6. 
 27. COHEN, supra note 3, at 1. 
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erendums needed to modify these limits) by issuing state SPE 
debt.28
D. FINANCING PRIVATE PROJECTS 
  
State SPEs are also commonly created to facilitate the fi-
nancing of private projects within a state through the issuance 
of tax-exempt bonds.29 The state SPE, acting as a “conduit,” is-
sues non-recourse bonds and then lends the bond proceeds to 
the parties constructing the project; investors in the bonds have 
recourse only to those parties and the project.30 Because a state 
conduit SPE is an instrumentality of the state, interest paid to 
investors on these bonds is exempt from federal taxation (under 
the federal municipal bond exemption), even though the con-
duit SPE is not responsible for repaying those investors.31 This 
elevates form over substance, enabling private parties to obtain 
low-cost tax-exempt financing.32
E. REDUCING STATE FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY 
 
As discussed, state SPEs increasingly have been used in 
recent years to reduce state financial transparency, generally 
by engaging in off-balance-sheet financing much as corporate 
SPEs have been used to reduce corporate transparency.33
 
 28. Beverly S. Bunch, The Effect of Constitutional Debt Limits on State 
Governments’ Use of Public Authorities, 68 PUB. CHOICE 57, 66 (1991) (con-
cluding that the “results of this empirical analysis support the literature’s 
claim that [at least one reason that] governments use public authorities [is] to 
circumvent state constitutional debt limits”). 
 Re-
duced transparency not only can mislead the public but also 
 29. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006); Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, 
supra note 22. 
 32. See Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22 (observ-
ing that the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York is an example of a 
state conduit SPE). Although an important purpose of corporate SPEs is to is-
sue debt with higher credit ratings than the credit rating on corporate debt, it 
would not appear that state SPEs could issue debt with higher credit ratings 
than the credit rating on state general obligation (GO) debt. The higher credit 
rating on debt issued by corporate SPEs reflects that the financial assets secu-
ritized by those SPEs “are usually more creditworthy, and almost always easi-
er to understand and value, than the company itself.” Testimony of Schwarcz, 
supra note 15. Public finance, however, is not as clearly asset based, and state 
SPEs would lack the taxing power of states and, in contrast to states, could be 
liquidated. 
 33. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text. 
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can enable government officials to avoid public scrutiny. In 
New York State, for example, 
[s]tatewide, politicians increasingly use [SPEs] as ATMs . . . with-
drawing funds so that they can balance General Fund shortfalls . . . . 
Initially, elected officials exercised some discipline and limited their 
‘withdrawals’ to capital projects which would have a long, useful life, 
but up front expense. More recently, however, withdrawals are being 
used for [short-term purposes].34
Off-balance-sheet financing is less tractable to solutions in pub-
lic finance than in corporate finance because, as will be shown, 
public finance is more susceptible than corporate finance to 
monitoring failures.
 
35
The taxonomy has shown that state SPEs can have positive 
utility, such as facilitating interstate arrangements and run-
ning state programs in ways that allocate associated risks to 
investors willing to take those risks.
 
36
II.  POTENTIAL ILLEGITIMACIES   
 But they also can have 
potential illegitimacies.  
The taxonomy indicates at least three potentially illegiti-
mate uses of state SPEs: to avoid state constitutional debt lim-
its, to avoid taxes by obtaining form-over-substance federal tax 
exemptions, and to reduce state financial transparency and en-
able government officials to avoid public scrutiny.37
 
 34. E-mail from Scott Fein, Partner, Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP 
and Dir., Pub. Auths. Project of the Gov't Law Ctr., Albany Law Sch., to au-
thor (Aug. 31, 2011) (on file with author). 
 Part II.A 
addresses the first two illegitimate uses and Part II.B address-
es the third.  
 35. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 36. State SPEs also have had historical benefits: 
[N]otwithstanding the fiscal peril they may pose, [state SPEs] played 
an important role underwriting the first meaningful urban infrastruc-
ture, helped fund the defense effort in both World Wars, and more re-
cently, at least in [New York State], allowed [the State] to expand 
housing and healthcare for the poor and elderly and implement envi-
ronmental safeguards . . . . In the absence of [state SPEs] our State 
(and Country) would be a different place. 
 E-mail from Scott Fein, supra note 34. 
 37. The allocation by states to enterprise SPEs and their investors of risks 
associated with the enterprise is not illegitimate. To the contrary, the use of 
SPEs to allocate risks more precisely between creators of SPEs and investors 
in securities issued by the SPEs is widely recognized as economically desira-
ble. See Testimony of Schwarcz, supra note 15; see also Nehemkis, supra note 
5, at 14 (stating that where a state SPE “depends for economic survival upon 
its own earnings rather than upon [state] legislative largess, a greater degree 
of operating efficiency results”). 
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A. CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY AND TAX AVOIDANCE 
Although state SPEs are sometimes used to avoid constitu-
tional debt limits in state constitutions, at least some of these 
limits would not support the increased functions of modern 
state government and hence are “obsolete.”38 Without the abil-
ity to get around these limits, many states “would barely be 
able to function.”39 Although a more democratic way of address-
ing the limits would be to amend state constitutions to increase 
or remove them,40
Similarly, the use of state conduit SPEs to take advantage 
of the federal municipal bond tax exemption is relatively 
straightforward, at least from the standpoint of state public fi-
nance. The interesting question is why this federal tax exemp-
tion, unlike most other U.S. Internal Revenue Code exemp-
tions,
 the longstanding use of state SPEs to bypass 
obsolete debt limits is not this Article’s central concern. 
41
B. REDUCING TRANSPARENCY AND AVOIDING PUBLIC SCRUTINY 
 respects form over substance. Answering that question, 
however, would primarily be a federal tax law inquiry and thus 
is beyond this Article’s scope. 
The most troubling use of state SPEs is their increasing 
use to reduce financial transparency and enable government 
officials to avoid public scrutiny. Consider transparency. Rating 
agencies and the public rely heavily on state financial state-
ments.42 The balance sheet—also called, in public finance, a 
statement of net assets—is central because it shows the state’s 
assets and liabilities.43
 
 38. Frant, supra note 
  
19, at 574. 
 39. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22. 
 40. Frant, supra note 19, at 574. 
 41. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935) (holding that, 
for federal tax purposes, a transaction’s substance is to be considered over its 
form); see also IRC § 183: Activities Not Engaged in For Profit (ATG), IRS.GOV, 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/IRC-%C2% 
A7-183:--Activities-Not-Engaged-in-For-Profit-%28ATG%29 (last updated Aug. 
3, 2012) (“The examiner needs to consider the substance of the facts.” (empha-
sis added)). 
 42. Cf. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY’S STATE RATING METHODOLO-
GY 11–12 (2004) (stating that “Moody’s relies heavily on audited GAAP [state] 
financial statements”). 
 43. See GASB, STATEMENT NO. 14: BASIC FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND 
MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS—FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENTS ¶ 83 (1999). 
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State SPE debt is often not shown, however, as balance-
sheet indebtedness of a state.44 On a purely technical level, this 
makes sense: state SPEs are legally separate units of states, 
and states rarely guarantee the debt of their units.45
Most state SPE debt is moral obligation debt, appropria-
tion-contingent debt, revenue debt, or non-recourse debt.
 States 
therefore are not usually legally obligated to pay that debt. The 
story, however, is more complicated. 
46
reserve fund equal to maximum annual debt service; if the reserve 
must be drawn down, certification shall be made to the governor (or 
another appropriate official) who must include a request for the defi-
ciency in the budget. The legislature is under no legal obligation to 
fund the request, hence the moral appellation.
 
Moral obligation debt means that the state SPE debt is sup-
ported by a  
47
Appropriation-contingent debt (also called appropriation debt) 
is different than moral obligation debt insofar as it contem-
plates the appropriation as the primary source of payment.
 
48 It 
is not technically a legal obligation of the state because the leg-
islature has no legal obligation to fund the appropriation.49 
Revenue debt is repayable solely from the profits of a state en-
terprise SPE, and thus legally is not state debt.50 And because 
non-recourse debt is not a legal obligation of the state conduit 
SPE that issues it, it is not a legal obligation of the state.51
State SPE debt that a state is not legally obligated to pay 
is not ordinarily shown as debt on the state’s balance-sheet. Oc-
casionally, state SPE debt is shown in a separate column as in-
debtedness of the state’s “component units.”
  
52
 
 44. See Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 
 However, the rel-
evant state accounting principles, promulgated by the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), require 
this disclosure only for debt of state SPEs that are both (i) “fis-
cally dependent” on the state—meaning that the state “either 
22. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (observing that explicit state guarantees of state SPE debt are 
“very rare”). 
 47. COHEN, supra note 3, at 5. 
 48. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 51. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., JOHN CHIANG, CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 28–29 (2011), available at http://www.sco.ca 
.gov/Files-ARD/CAFR/cafr10web.pdf. 
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has authority over the [state SPE’s] budget, the setting of its 
taxes and charges, or its issuance of debt”53—and also (ii) in a 
non-temporary “financial benefit or burden relationship” with 
the state.54 Thus, if a state is “only required to approve the is-
suance of revenue bonds for a water district but the water dis-
trict does not receive a [non-temporary] subsidy” from the state, 
the water district “would not be considered a component unit” 
of the state.55 Although GASB accounting principles becoming 
effective in 2012 could be broadly read to permit a state to re-
port state SPE financing obligations—even absent any legal ob-
ligation by the state with respect to financing—such reporting 
will not be mandated.56
Accordingly, state SPE debt is rarely shown as debt on 
state balance sheets and, even when shown (usually in a sepa-
rate column as indebtedness of the state’s component units),
  
57 
may not be easily discernible. In 2006, for example, New York 
State’s financial statements showed $48.5 billion of debt but 
failed to show another $80 billion of state SPE debt.58
This “off-balance-sheet” nature of state SPE debt can be 
misleading, however, if the state ultimately backstops the SPE 
debt. As discussed below, states often have strong economic and 
reputational motivations to backstop the debt of their SPEs, 
notwithstanding the absence of a legal obligation to do so. 
  
 
 53. GASB, GASB STATEMENT CONCLUDES REVIEW OF STANDARDS DEFIN-
ING THE FINANCIAL REPORTING ENTITY 2 (2011), available at http://www.gasb 
.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175822186077&blobheader=appli
cation%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 2–3 (using the example of a water district of a county, and as-
suming that the water district does not itself “provide resources to the county” 
other than indirectly by virtue of managing the county’s water resources). 
 56. For example, GASB provides discretion to a primary government to 
include organizations that “do not meet the specific financial accountability 
criteria” as component units if doing so would “prevent the reporting entity’s 
financial statements from being misleading.” GASB, EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra 
note 8, ¶ 39.  
 57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 58. See NYS Debt Facts, N.Y. ST. OFF. ST. COMPTROLLER, http://osc.state 
.ny.us/debt/debtfacts.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2012); see also THOMAS P. 
DINAPOLI, OFFICE OF STATE COMPTROLLER, STATE OF N.Y. COMPREHENSIVE 
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 2010, at 187 
(2010), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/finance/finreports/cafr10.pdf 
(neglecting to separate out state SPE debt when identifying types of outstand-
ing debt ratios). 
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1. De Facto “Guarantees”  
A state will often have strong economic motivations to 
backstop the debt of its SPEs. Except arguably in the case of 
non-recourse debt of state conduit SPEs,59 a default on such 
debt would signal uncertainty as to whether the state will pay 
its debts generally, thereby jeopardizing the state’s credit rat-
ing.60 For example, in 1984 the State of Ohio stood behind its 
water development authority’s revenue debt in order to reduce 
rating-agency scrutiny of a technical default on that debt.61 
Markets and investors likewise believe that the economic com-
pulsion to avoid increased borrowing costs resulting from a de-
fault on state SPE debt provides “enough incentive for the state 
to pay” that debt to avoid an authority default.62 Some courts 
have therefore ruled that (non-conduit) state SPE debt consti-
tutes debt of the state for constitutional purposes.63
There are several other reasons why a state may decide to 
support payment of its state SPE debt, even though the state is 
not legally obligated to do so. Because state SPEs often operate 
as an integral part of state government,
  
64
 
 59. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 
 the state may have 
no practical choice but to support the SPE in order to support 
the government services performed by the SPE—essentially a 
“too-important-to-fail” variant of the corporate notion of too-big-
22. 
 60. Cf. Moral Obligation Bonds, STANDARD & POOR’S (June 27, 2006, 
12:26 AM), http://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/ratings/articles/en/us/? 
articleType=HTML&assetID=1245334963892 (observing that if “a properly 
structured moral obligation defaulted, despite clear original legislative sup-
port, the state’s willingness to pay on its other debt would need to be exam-
ined”). 
 61. E-mail from W. Bartley Hildreth, Professor of Pub. Mgmnt. & Policy, 
Ga. State Univ. Andrew Young Sch. of Policy Studies, to author (Apr. 25, 2011) 
(on file with author). 
 62. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22; see also E-
mail from Scott Fein, supra note 34 (“Your observation about credit issues as-
sociated with default is in this State [New York] absolutely correct. Moral ob-
ligation bonds[] are, as you know, referred to on Wall Street as ‘feel good 
bonds’ . . . they allow the State to feel good that it’s not really increasing the 
State’s aggregate debt and Wall Street to feel good that moral obligation debt 
is really GO debt in different clothing. Both know that although it may only be 
a moral commitment . . . a default would, as you pointed out in your discussion 
of the UDC [see infra note 75 and accompanying text], run the risk of curtail-
ing the capital markets to the State.”). 
 63. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22 (observing 
that “two or three states” have case law holding this, although “about one-
half ” of the states have case law holding to the contrary). 
 64. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing enterprise 
SPEs). 
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to-fail. In a federal context, for example, the government re-
cently supported payment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
debt in order to promote stability and liquidity in the housing 
markets.65
A state also may support payment of an SPE’s debt in or-
der to honor a moral obligation. This is especially likely to occur 
where the state SPE has issued moral-obligation debt. It also 
could occur, however, where the state has issued appropriation-
contingent debt since there “remains a potential moral obliga-
tion” to fund the appropriation.
 This not only constitutes a de facto guarantee but 
also suggests that state SPEs considered by their managers to 
be too important to fail might engage in morally hazardous be-
havior.  
66
Additionally, a state may support payment of an SPE’s 
debt merely to protect the state’s reputation more generally. In 
a corporate context, for example, at the outset of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis many banks backstopped their affiliated struc-
tured investment vehicles (SIVs) solely to protect the banks’ 
reputations.
  
67 In the case of Citigroup, this occurred notwith-
standing that it reduced the capital ratio that regulators moni-
tor to gauge that bank’s ability to withstand losses on bad 
loans68 and caused Moody’s to lower the bank’s long-term credit 
rating.69 The reputational harm of not supporting payment of 
an SPE’s debt may be even greater in a state than a corporate 
context because “investor perception of an implicit . . . govern-
ment guarantee is hard to break,”70
 
 65. Lorraine Woellert & John Gittelsohn, Fannie-Freddie Fix at $160 Bil-
lion with $1 Trillion Worst Case, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 13, 2010), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-13/fannie-freddie-fix-expands-to-160-billion 
-with-worst-case-at-1-trillion.html. 
 even by “statutory dis-
 66. See E-mail from W. Bartley Hildreth, supra note 61 (stating that even 
with appropriation-contingent debt there “remains a potential moral obliga-
tion,” and observing that a moral-obligation argument was used “against the 
Governor’s hesitancy to get involved with the bond rating analysts’ questions” 
about whether the state would support a state SPE’s debt).  
 67. Shannon D. Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup to Consolidate 
Seven SIVs on Balance Sheet (Update3), BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 13, 2007), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=aT0Ix2iDnZRk (re-
porting that Citigroup Inc. did this in the amount of $49 billion, following sim-
ilar decisions by HSBC Holdings PLC and WestLB AG to backstop their SIVs). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (reporting a lowering from Aa2 to Aa3). 
 70. Block, supra note 17, at 437 (referencing investor perception of an im-
plicit U.S. government backing of Fannie Mae’s debt). 
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claimers and [prospectus] disclosures” that the SPE debt is not 
backed by the government.71
For all of these reasons—to avoid jeopardizing its credit 
rating, to support government services performed by an SPE, to 
honor its moral obligations, and to generally protect its reputa-
tion—a state may well backstop the debt of its SPEs notwith-
standing the absence of a legal obligation to do so. State finan-
cial statements that do not transparently disclose that debt and 
the state’s de facto guarantee thereof would be misleading. As 
discussed, however, states rarely make that disclosure in their 
financial statements.
 
72
2. Consequences of Lack of Transparency  
  
The lack of transparency can undermine public finance and 
also make it even more likely that states will continue to man-
age their financial affairs with insufficient regard to their abil-
ity to repay debts.73 That ability is not unlimited, even under a 
state’s taxing power. At some point, an increase in the tax rate 
will cease to raise tax revenues because taxpayers will lose the 
incentive to earn income, engage in more tax planning to re-
duce their effective tax rate, or move to other states, causing 
economic output (and tax revenues) of the troubled state to de-
cline further.74
Lack of transparency can also create financial contagion 
due to investor difficulty in distinguishing among types of state 
debt. For example, as a result of the 1975 default by a New 
 The state ultimately may have to cut back on 
essential services; and creditors—even those whose debt claims 
are backed by the state’s full faith and credit—may suffer loss-
es if the state, unable to raise sufficient tax revenues to repay 
its obligations, is forced to restructure its debts.  
 
 71. Id. (referencing statutory disclaimers and prospectus disclosures that 
Fannie Mae’s debt is not backed by the U.S. government). In 1963, for exam-
ple, the City of Chicago paid eighty percent of the back interest on bonds is-
sued by the Calumet Skyway Authority due to a “feeling that a bond default 
by the Authority might damage the city’s overall bond rating.” MITCHELL, su-
pra note 4, at 97 (citations omitted).  
 72. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 73. Cf. State and Municipal Debt: The Coming Crisis?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs., & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the 
H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of 
Rep. Patrick McHenry, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform) (ob-
serving that the “vast majority of states now find themselves in a fiscal 
straightjacket”). 
 74. Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 
UCLA L. REV. 322, 327 (2011) [hereinafter Schwarcz, State Bankruptcy]. 
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York State SPE (the Urban Development Corporation) on its 
moral obligation bonds,75 financial markets shut off financing 
for all New York State bonds.76 Federal backing was ultimately 
required to allow the state to return to the bond markets.77
Additionally, lack of transparency can mislead not only in-
vestors but also citizens as to real costs. In a prominent exam-
ple, a state SPE (the Washington Public Power Supply System, 
commonly known as WPPSS) issued revenue bonds in order to 
finance the construction of two power plants.
  
78 The revenue 
bonds were secured by contracts with local utility districts to 
purchase the resulting electricity.79 Unknown to residents,80 the 
utility districts agreed to support payment of the bonds even if 
the plants were never completed.81 Due to cost overruns, the 
plants were not, in fact, completed,82 leaving the utility dis-
tricts—and thus residents of those districts—as the deep pock-
ets for payment.83
Finally, lack of transparency can impose an unforeseen 
burden on out-of-state taxpayers. This could occur, for example, 
if the federal government, as a result of increasingly negative 
  
 
 75. The UDC, tasked with building low cost housing throughout the state, 
was given authority to issue $2 billion worth of bonds backed by the moral ob-
ligation of the state. But, due largely to inept management, the authority was 
unable to repay its debt. DONALD AXELROD, SHADOW GOVERNMENT 74 (1992). 
 76. Id. at 72–80. The contagion effect may have been exacerbated by New 
York City’s concurrent financial crisis. Id. 
 77. Id. at 81. 
 78. Id. at 66–69. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 67, 101. 
 81. Id. at 67 (observing that the local utility districts were required to 
service WPPSS bonds regardless of whether the plants became operational). It 
is unclear why the utility districts did not disclose their effective guarantees of 
the WPPSS bonds. The likely reason is that accounting principles do not al-
ways require disclosure of contingent guarantees. See FIN. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD. (FASB), STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES ¶¶ 2–3, 8 (1975). These paragraphs 
were not affected by subsequent proposed amendments. FASB, EXPOSURE 
DRAFT, DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN LOSS CONTINGENCIES 16–20 (2008). Axelrod 
asserts the lack of disclosure was a result of WPPSS not being answerable to 
any of the democratic institutions in the state. AXELROD, supra note 75, at 
101. But that does not explain why the utility districts did not themselves 
make the disclosure. 
 82. AXELROD, supra note 75, at 67. 
 83. The utility districts, at the behest of residents, then sued WPPSS to 
challenge the legality of the contracts and prevent being forced to pay for 
plants that were never completed. Id. at 69. A politicized Supreme Court of 
Washington sided with the utility districts and voided the contracts. Id. With-
out revenue to support the bonds, WPPSS defaulted. Id.  
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state fiscal conditions,84 is called on to bail out a state’s SPE 
debt.85
3. Comparing State and Corporate SPE Lack of Transparency  
 
The analysis above has shown that the use of state SPEs 
can reduce a state’s financial transparency, with egregious con-
sequences for the state, its residents, its creditors, and poten-
tially the federal government (and thus taxpayers throughout 
the country). The Article next compares those consequences 
with the consequences of the lack of transparency caused by 
corporate SPEs.  
A lack of transparency caused by corporate SPE debt can 
lead to companies unexpectedly failing and can also have sys-
temic consequences to the financial system.86 For these reasons, 
Congress and the SEC have devoted significant attention to an 
appropriate regulatory framework.87
The lack of transparency caused by state SPE debt can 
similarly lead, as discussed, to unexpected state financial prob-
lems.
  
88 That lack of transparency might also have systemic con-
sequences; by undermining governmental financial integrity, it 
could infect government securities markets.89
 
 84. Many states are believed to be at or near crisis levels of debt. See, e.g., 
Mary Williams Walsh, State Debt Woes Grow Too Big to Camouflage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/ 
business/economy/30states.html?pagewanted=1. Several of these states, such 
as New York and California, are also some of the heaviest issuers of SPE debt. 
The recession is expected to only continue to negatively impact state’s fiscal 
conditions. See PHIL OLIFF ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 
STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf. 
 Although it would 
appear that systemic consequences could be greater in a corpo-
rate than a state context because markets for corporate debt 
 85. Many believe that the most heavily indebted states will require a 
bailout or a type of assisted bankruptcy from the federal government. See, e.g., 
Mary Williams Walsh, A Path Is Sought for States to Escape Debt Burdens, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
01/21/business/economy/21bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all. Unforeseen state 
SPE debt would need to be addressed if, for example, the state relies on the 
indebted SPEs for essential services. 
 86. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 87. See infra Part III.B. 
 88. See supra notes 73–85 and accompanying text. 
 89. Compare Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008) 
(examining systemic consequences of corporate financial failures), with 
Schwarcz, State Bankruptcy, supra note 74 (examining systemic consequences 
of state financial failures). 
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are larger than markets for state debt,90 any comparison of con-
sequences must be qualified by the possibility of correlations 
between those markets. A loss of confidence in, or a collapse of, 
government securities markets could trigger a broader lack of 
confidence or collapse of debt markets, possibly affecting the 
markets for corporate debt securities. A somewhat parallel 
event occurred in 2008 when a collapse of the mortgage-backed 
securities market triggered the broader collapse of virtually all 
markets for debt securities.91 Similarly, the current European 
Union sovereign debt crisis is believed to have the potential to 
trigger broader systemic consequences.92
Therefore, as with corporate SPE debt, attention should be 
given to creating an appropriate regulatory framework for 
problems of state SPE debt. Indeed, the need for such a regula-
tory framework may even be greater in the state than the cor-
porate context. States may have a greater inherent propensity 
than corporations to want to use SPEs to raise off-balance-
sheet debt. Because states, unlike corporations, cannot “fail” in 
the sense of being forced to liquidate, they lack that deterrent 
against non-transparent use of SPEs.
 
93
Furthermore, state public finance is more susceptible than 
corporate finance to monitoring failures. States are monitored 
  
 
 90. In the second quarter of 2011, there was reportedly $7.8 trillion of 
corporate debt outstanding in the United States, versus only $2.9 trillion of 
state and municipal debt. Outstanding U.S. Bond Market Debt, SIFMA.ORG 
(June 8, 2012), http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/ 
StatisticsFiles/CM-US-Bond-Market-Outstanding-SIFMA.xls.  
 91. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 1359–61.  
 92. See, e.g., How to Save the Euro, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2011, at 11, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21529049 (“As credit lines gum up 
and outsiders plead for action, it is not just the euro that is at risk, but the fu-
ture of the European Union and the health of the world economy. . . . A Greek 
default would threaten many banks, not just in Greece: this week the markets 
took aim at French banks that hold southern European debt.”). Corporate 
counterparty risk, on the other hand, is more likely to have a systemic impact 
than governmental counterparty risk because corporate viability is more likely 
to be closely correlated than governmental viability since governments cannot 
be liquidated. Cf. supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the rela-
tionship between systemic risk and the correlation of financial viability). 
 93. Cf. Block, supra note 17, at 369–70 (observing that the risk of bank-
ruptcy provides at least a “modest[] check on corporate accounting gimmicks,” 
but lacking bankruptcy, “temptations for the government to engage in creative 
accounting may be even greater than those in the private sector”). Even 
though states cannot be liquidated, they still will have significant incentives to 
avoid default. It is unclear, though, whether those incentives are as strong as 
the incentive to avoid liquidation, and thus whether they are as likely to en-
courage sound financial choices.  
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by residents and creditors.94 Corporations, in contrast, are mon-
itored by shareholders and creditors.95 Creditors monitor only 
to the limited extent of their negotiated covenants, and cove-
nants in state debt are even more limited than covenants in 
corporate debt.96
States are also monitored by residents, who have even less 
incentive to monitor than most creditors. Unlike creditors, few 
if any state residents are likely to have sufficient amounts at 
stake to justify the cost of monitoring.
 Therefore creditor monitoring of state SPE 
debt is likely to be even more limited than creditor monitoring 
of corporate SPE debt.  
97 The ability of state res-
idents to freely choose to move to another state, notwithstand-
ing some cost in doing so, may well further reduce their incen-
tive to monitor.98
 
 94. See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 
 Furthermore, residents who wish to monitor 
state SPE debt may find themselves unable to correct problems 
revealed by the monitoring. For example, after voters in New 
York State rejected a $500 million bond issue in November 
5, at 872–74 (noting that while cor-
porations are accountable to shareholders and creditors, public authorities do 
not have shareholders, and the public has no shareholder enforcement mecha-
nisms). 
 95. Id. at 872–73 (“[C]orporations are scrutinized and evaluated by nu-
merous groups such as investors, government entities and shareholders.”). 
 96. Id. at 878 (discussing the oversight that corporate shareholders and 
creditors have over the actions of corporations, but there is no group that has 
“taken on the shareholder[] role” in the context of public authorities). Cove-
nants in state debt may be more limited than covenants in corporate debt be-
cause states, unlike corporations, have taxing power and cannot be liquidated. 
Recently there has been discussion of adding covenants to state debt securities 
in an effort to exert fiscal discipline. See, e.g., Ted Phillips, Control by Cove-
nant, BOND BUYER, Mar. 18, 2010, at 1, 6, available at http://www.bondbuyer 
.com/issues/119_301/new_york_state_budget-1009673-1.html?zkPrintable= 
true (reporting plan of New York Lieutenant Governor Richard Ravitch to in-
clude “an event of default if the review board found the budget out of balance, 
and neither the Legislature nor the governor took steps to return it to bal-
ance”); Yvette Shields, Experts Weigh in on Fixing Illinois, BOND BUYER, June 
30, 2011, at 1, 8, available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/119_373/ 
illinois_budget-1014194-1.html?zkPrintable=true.  
 97. See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 5, 881–82 (“[T]he public has signifi-
cantly less voting power, enforcement rights and political power than private 
shareholder investors in private corporations . . . . In many ways, avoiding 
public participation is the reason public authorities are created.”). 
 98. The WPPSS debacle also shows that residents may not even become 
aware of problems until too late. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying 
text (observing that residents of local utility districts were not informed that 
those districts had effectively guaranteed payment of WPPSS bonds). The res-
idents only became aware of the problem after electricity costs rose to pay for 
the cost of those bonds. AXELROD, supra note 75, at 69 (discussing a “consumer 
revolt” after electricity rates increased greatly).  
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1981, the State directed one of its SPEs, the Urban Develop-
ment Corporation, to issue the bonds.99 A citizens’ lawsuit to 
stop that bond issuance was dismissed by a court as lacking 
standing because the New York State Constitution gave voters 
the right to approve only the issuance of bonds issued by the 
“[s]tate.”100
In contrast, corporations are monitored by shareholders in 
addition to creditors. Shareholders can have concentrated hold-
ings, and they face few if any legal obstacles to monitoring and 
enforcement.
 
101 Moreover, shareholders have a greater incen-
tive than creditors to monitor because shareholders are residu-
al claimants who would lose money before creditors.102
In short, creditor monitoring of states and corporations is 
limited. Shareholder monitoring helps fill that shortfall for cor-
porations, but resident monitoring is unlikely to fill that short-
fall for states. The resulting monitoring insufficiency may make 
it even more likely that states (as compared to corporations) 
will use SPEs to hide debt.
 
103
4. Undermining Democratic Control of State Functions  
 
Although not the primary focus of this Article, it should be 
noted that another significant difference between state SPEs 
and corporate SPEs is the potential for state SPEs to under-
mine governmental legitimacy. State SPEs are usually “gov-
erned by an appointed board with policymaking and budgetary 
independence from the state . . . that created them.”104
 
 99. AXELROD, supra note 
 One 
commentator describes these entities as creating “a hidden 
75, at 122. 
 100. Id. at 122–23. 
 101. See Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate 
Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 69 
(2010–2011) (“In sum, shareholder activism itself, changing market condi-
tions, and regulatory changes have ushered in a new shareholder-oriented 
world for public corporations in which more investors are able and willing to 
take a greater role in shaping corporate decision-making . . . .” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 102. Id. at 102. 
 103. Cf. Scott Fein, Would a State Constitutional Amendment Promote Pub-
lic Authority Fiscal Reform?, 12 N.Y. ST. B.A. GOV’T, L. & POL’Y J. 52, 53 
(2010) (observing that New York State has, in the past, increased issuance of 
state-supported SPE debt in an effort to avoid the public referenda required 
for issuance of state debt). 
 104. Bourdeaux, supra note 16, at 442. State SPEs usually have the “right 
to sue and be sued, own property, and may have the ability to tax and invoke 
eminent domain.” Id. 
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government that is not highly accountable through regular 
democratic processes.”105 Others say these entities “function 
outside the normal framework of government.”106
This Article has already discussed how state SPEs are used 
to circumvent state constitutional debt limits. More broadly, 
however, state SPEs have been considered a means by which 
the corporate management structure (and its believed efficien-
cy) could be applied to public-sector management, thereby 
avoiding political constraints and bureaucratic red tape.
  
107 
State SPEs are thus not always subject to the types of controls 
applicable to managers of traditional state government agen-
cies.108 For example, competitive bidding procedures—which 
traditionally are used to diminish favoritism and political cor-
ruption in governmental contracting—are not necessarily ap-
plicable to state SPEs.109 At least one commentator argues that, 
except for multi-jurisdictional state SPEs, the “benefits” accru-
ing from this supposed corporate efficiency are largely illuso-
ry.110
The Article next considers how regulation could help to 
mitigate state SPE abuses, focusing on the problem of state 
SPE debt. 
  
III.  TOWARDS REGULATORY SOLUTIONS   
Although state SPEs raise many concerns, including con-
cerns over their use to reduce state financial transparency, 
they do have legitimate uses. Therefore, rather than banning 
state SPEs outright, regulatory solutions should seek to ad-
dress the concerns. This Part begins that inquiry by examining 
recent state SPE reform efforts. It then compares those efforts 
with recent reforms of corporate SPEs. Thereafter, the Article 
 
 105. Id. at 441 (emphasis added); see also Bunch, supra note 28, at 57 (ob-
serving, at that time, that “[m]uch of the literature on public authorities indi-
cates that governments use authorities to circumvent debt limits”). 
 106. Robert G. Smith, The Web of Actors in Authority Policy Implementa-
tion, 18 POL’Y STUD. J. 986, 986 (1990). 
 107. Shestack, supra note 5, at 555. 
 108. For example, responding to the failure of the Massachusetts Housing 
and Finance Authority and to certain other Massachusetts SPE failures, State 
Senator Patricia McGovern explained, “[w]hile each authority may have been 
justified on its own merits, the combined effect of these efforts has been to 
place the state in a precarious situation where many of its critical functions 
are performed by autonomous, non-elected governmental units.” AXELROD, su-
pra note 75, at 103 (quoting Senator Patricia McGovern). 
 109. Shestack, supra note 5, at 565. 
 110. See id. at 569.  
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develops a broader conceptual framework for regulating state 
SPEs.  
A. RECENT STATE SPE REFORM EFFORTS 
New York State has attempted in recent years to reform its 
state SPEs. Beginning in 2000, it passed a series of three 
laws111 to “[r]ein[] in New York’s [s]ecret [g]overnment.”112 The 
Debt Reform Act of 2000 established statutory limits for the 
amount and terms of state SPE debt that New York is contrac-
tually or constitutionally obligated to pay.113 These limits, how-
ever, do not address moral obligation debt or debt for which 
New York is contingently obligated.114
In 2005, New York passed the Public Authorities Account-
ability Act,
 
115 which imposed heightened state SPE reporting 
requirements and stricter governance rules.116 And in 2009, 
New York enacted the Public Authorities Reform Act,117 estab-
lishing the Authorities Budget Office to review and analyze 
state SPEs.118
 
 111. Wilson & Eichelberger, supra note 
  
1, at 18–21. 
 112. OFFICE OF BUDGET & POLICY ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF THE STATE COMP-
TROLLER, PUBLIC AUTHORITY REFORM: REINING IN NEW YORK’S SECRET GOV-
ERNMENT (2004), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb04/ 
publicauthorityreform.pdf. 
 113. Wilson & Eichelberger, supra note 1, at 18; see also N.Y. STATE FIN. 
LAW §§ 67-a, 67-b (McKinney 2011). 
 114. “State-supported debt” is defined as 
any bonds or notes, including bonds or notes issued to fund reserve 
funds and costs of issuance, issued by the state or a state public cor-
poration for which the state is constitutionally obligated to pay debt 
service or is contractually obligated to pay debt service subject to an 
appropriation, except where the state has a contingent contractual ob-
ligation. 
§ 67-a. Furthermore, neither obligations due in less than one year nor those 
pursuant to annual legislative appropriations are considered “debt” subject to 
New York state’s constitutional requirement for public referenda. 87 N.Y. JUR. 
2D PUB. SEC. § 10 (2011) (citing § 67-b(1)(a); Local Gov’t Assistance Corp. v. 
Sales Tax Asset Receivable Corp., 2 N.Y.3d 524 (2004)). 
 115. 2005 N.Y. Laws ch. 766. 
 116. Wilson & Eichelberger, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
 117. 2009 N.Y. Laws ch. 506. The legislative findings in section 1 of the 
Public Authorities Reform Act stated that, even after enactment of the Public 
Authorities Accountability Act of 2005, “fundamental problems of transparen-
cy, accountability, the responsibilities and functions of board members and 
oversight have not been addressed, leading to a lack of public trust in these 
institutions.” Id. § 1. 
 118. Wilson & Eichelberger, supra note 1, at 20–21.  
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These reforms have already started bearing fruit. For ex-
ample, the New York State Comptroller has reported that, “[a]s 
a result of audit findings and recommendations, and adminis-
trative and legislative actions,” a number of New York’s state 
SPEs had announced actions to improve their accountability.119 
The Comptroller also more recently observed that several state 
SPEs had restructured their bonds after seeking the Comptrol-
ler’s approval, resulting “in total debt service savings of $456.9 
million on a cash flow basis and $175.9 million on a net present 
value basis over the life of the bonds.”120 The Comptroller has 
also released reports on the operations of specific state SPEs.121
B. RECENT CORPORATE SPE REFORM EFFORTS 
 
Regulatory efforts to reform the use of corporate SPEs be-
gan, in response to Enron’s collapse, with promulgation by 
Congress of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002122 and the issuance 
by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission of a 
2005 report on off-balance-sheet corporate transactions (SEC 
Staff Report).123 These regulatory efforts then continued, 
spurred by the 2008 financial crisis, with the Dodd-Frank Act124 
and the government-agency rulemaking thereunder.125
 
 119. OFFICE OF BUDGET & POLICY ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF THE STATE COMP-
TROLLER, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN NEW YORK STATE: ACCELERATING MOMEN-
TUM TO ACHIEVE REFORM 38–39 (2005), available at http://www.osc.state.ny 
.us/reports/pubauth/pubauthoritiesreform.pdf. 
  
 120. THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, PUBLIC 
AUTHORITY DEBT STRUCTURE AND NEW YORK’S FUTURE GENERATIONS 1 
(2010), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pubauth/reports/pa-debt-struct 
-092710.pdf. 
 121. See New York’s Public Authorities, OFF. ST. COMPTROLLER, 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pubauth/reports.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2012) (in-
cluding reports on the New York State Urban Development Corporation, the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and the New York State Thruway Au-
thority). 
 122. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 123. STAFF OF THE SEC, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 401(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS 
WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND 
TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT]. The SEC 
Staff Report was informally issued by the SEC staff without formal approval 
by the SEC’s Commissioners; it thus was not an official report of the SEC. 
 124. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 125. Much of the substance of the Dodd-Frank Act will be realized through 
administrative rulemaking by the SEC and other federal government agen-
cies. Cf. Lois L. Weinroth & Richard L. Fried, Securitization Provisions of the 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act indirectly addressed improving 
accounting standards that govern when corporate SPEs should 
be consolidated with their parent companies.126 The SEC Staff 
Report, however, more directly focused on the use of corporate 
SPEs to reduce financial transparency.127 Observing that “many 
of the areas dealing with off-balance sheet arrangements in-
volve significant use of accounting-motivated structured trans-
actions” that utilize corporate SPEs,128 the SEC staff advocated 
against “transactions and transaction structures primarily mo-
tivated by accounting and reporting concerns, rather than eco-
nomics.”129 In that connection, the SEC staff urged the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, the corporate 
equivalent of the GASB) to consider changing corporate ac-
counting principles in order to increase the transparency of 
corporate SPE debt and also admonished participants in the fi-
nancial reporting process to become more aware of the prob-
lem.130 To that end, FASB revoked its Financial Accounting 
Standard No. 140, which governed off-balance-sheet treatment 
of certain corporate SPE debt, and replaced it with a more nu-
anced (although also more ambiguous) test.131
The Dodd-Frank Act did not address the use of corporate 
SPEs per se, instead focusing on their use in securitization 
transactions.
 
132
 
Dodd-Frank Act, 16 J. STRUCTURED FIN., Fall 2010, at 38, 43 (“[I]t is impossi-
ble to predict at this time the full range of regulations that will be applicable 
to the asset-backed securitization industry.”). 
 These are transactions in which corporate SPEs 
 126. See Neal Newman, Enron and the Special Purpose Entities—Use or 
Abuse?—The Real Problem—The Real Focus, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 97, 
122–23 (2007). 
 127. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 123, at 3 (identifying a variety of 
“initiatives to improve transparency . . . in the financial reporting process”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 166: 
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AN AMENDMENT OF FASB 
STATEMENT NO. 140 (2009), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer? 
blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175823288480&blobheader=application%2Fpdf& 
blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.  
 132. Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Bus., Duke 
Univ. Sch. of Law, The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture at the SEC His-
torical Society: Protecting Investors in Securitization Transactions: Does 
Dodd-Frank Help, or Hurt? (Mar. 28, 2011) (transcript available at http:// 
c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/programs/sechistorical-
032811-transcript.pdf; audio available at http://www.sechistorical.org/ 
collection/programs/sechistorical-032811-podcast.mp3) [hereinafter Schwarcz, 
2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture].  
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issue securities to investors and use the proceeds to purchase 
financial assets, collections on which are used to repay the se-
curities.133 In that context, Dodd-Frank addressed, essentially, 
three issues: (1) improving disclosure to investors in the securi-
ties about the nature of the underlying financial assets; (2) lim-
iting conflicts of interest between originators of those financial 
assets and investors in securities issued by corporate SPEs 
purchasing those assets; and (3) increasing rating agency scru-
tiny of securitization transactions.134 The first two issues have 
little application per se to state SPEs, which have not been 
used (and there is no indication they are likely to be used) for 
securitization transactions.135
C. A BROADER CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM 
 Nonetheless, the broader goals of 
Dodd-Frank to improve investor disclosure, to limit conflicts of 
interest, and to increase rating agency scrutiny have some res-
onance for state SPEs.  
These regulatory efforts to reform state and corporate 
SPEs suggest four overarching organizing principles: improving 
transparency of state SPE debt; improving monitoring of state 
SPEs; limiting state SPE debt; and improving state SPE gov-
ernance. In deriving a broader conceptual framework, this Arti-
cle first compares whether these principles would address all of 
the types of negative consequences identified in this Article.136
(i) The off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt (i.e., that 
debt is often not shown as a liability on the balance sheets of 
their sponsoring states) can undermine state financial integri-
ty, making it more likely, for example, that states will continue 
to manage their financial affairs with insufficient regard to 
their ability to repay their debts. This can lead to unexpected 
state financial problems, especially if the state ultimately back-
stops the SPE debt (and states often have strong economic and 
reputational motivations to de facto guarantee that debt, not-
withstanding the absence of a legal obligation to do so). 
 
Those consequences can be summarized as follows:  
 
 133. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 134. Schwarcz, 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture, supra note 132. 
 135. It is not even certain that Dodd-Frank’s reforms make sense in the 
securitization context. See id. If state SPEs were to begin to engage in securit-
ization transactions, regulators could then consider the extent to which Dodd-
Frank’s reforms, or possible other reforms, should apply. 
 136. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59 
(2003) (arguing that legal reasoning may not exist as an independent concept, 
and that what really matters is consequences). 
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(ii) The off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt might 
also have systemic consequences by causing a loss of confidence 
in state and possibly other government securities markets. 
(iii) The off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt can 
mislead not only investors—including by creating contagion 
due to investor difficulty in distinguishing among types of state 
debt—but also state citizens as to real costs. Furthermore, a 
federal government bailout of that debt can impose an unfore-
seen burden on out-of-state taxpayers. 
(iv) These consequences can be worse in public finance 
than in corporate finance because the use of SPEs in public fi-
nance is more susceptible to monitoring failures than their use 
in corporate finance. 
(v) The non-representative corporate-style governance of 
state SPEs can undermine constitutional and democratic legit-
imacy. It can also generate conflicts that cause a state SPE to 
incur debt for its own benefit and not necessarily for the state’s 
benefit.137
Thus, the negative consequences identified in this Article 
result from the off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt, 
monitoring failures relating thereto, and state SPE governance 
failures.  
 
These consequences correlate well to the overarching or-
ganizing principles suggested by regulatory efforts to reform 
state and corporate SPEs. The principle of improving transpar-
ency of state SPE debt would address consequences from the 
off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt; the principle of im-
proving monitoring of state SPE debt would address conse-
quences of monitoring failures; the principle of limiting state 
SPEs debt could address all those consequences; and the prin-
ciple of improving state SPE governance would address conse-
quences of governance failures.  
This Article’s conceptual framework for regulatory reform 
therefore adopts these four overarching organizing principles: 
improving transparency of state SPE debt; improving monitor-
ing of state SPE debt; limiting state SPE debt; and improving 
state SPE governance. To apply these principles to actual regu-
latory reform, I have incorporated the principles into a Model 
 
 137. This is not dissimilar to the agency-cost concerns addressed in 
Schwarcz, Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, supra note 9, and 
in Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Sec-
ondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009). 
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Public Authorities Oversight Law (Model Oversight Law),138
Before doing so, however, it is worth asking why a state 
would consider enacting the Model Oversight Law or similar 
legislation, which would limit the state’s ability to continue is-
suing non-transparent debt through SPEs. One answer is that 
the state would be increasing its financial transparency, as 
New York State has been trying to do.
 
proposed for enactment by individual states. I next examine 
how these principles, as articulated in the Model Oversight 
Law, could be applied. 
139 New York has even 
found that improving the transparency of its SPE debt can, at 
least in certain cases, save money.140 Another answer is that as 
the problem of state SPE debt becomes more publicly known, 
states that don’t engage in reform will face reputational 
costs.141 These costs might even include increased financing 
costs as investors become wary of the non-transparent financial 
condition of reform-averse states. And public and media outcry 
about the problem might put pressure on GASB to engage in its 
own effort to further reform government accounting principles 
for state SPE debt, which would remove the initiative from the 
states.142 Finally, if all else fails, the federal government could 
consider making state SPE reform a condition of any federal 
government bailout of a state.143 So long as the state ultimately 
chooses whether to enact the reform, that should not impose an 
unconstitutional encroachment on state sovereignty.144
D. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK 
 
This Part considers each principle in turn, examining how 
the Model Oversight Law incorporates the principle and how 
that Law would apply to state SPEs.145
 
 138. See infra. app. I. 
 To that end, this Part 
 139. See supra notes 112–21 and accompanying text.  
 140. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 142. FASB has been trying to do that for corporate accounting principles 
governing SPE debt. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra note 85 (observing that “[m]any believe that the most heavi-
ly indebted states will require a bailout or a type of assisted bankruptcy from 
the federal government”).  
 144. See Schwarcz, State Bankruptcy, supra note 74, at 336  (explaining 
why, so long as a “state has the right to decide whether or not to [enact a fed-
erally proposed legal framework], its sovereignty would not be impugned”). 
(footnote omitted)). 
 145. All references to specific sections in the remainder of the Article refer 
to the Model Oversight Law in Appendix I. 
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examines how the Model Oversight Law incorporates, and 
would apply to state SPEs, the principles of improving trans-
parency, improving monitoring, limiting debt, and improving 
governance. 
1. Improving Transparency of State SPE Debt  
The Model Oversight Law seeks to improve transparency 
in two ways. The customary way of making debt transparent is 
by requiring balance-sheet disclosure under accounting rules. 
In the United States, accounting rules are promulgated by—
pursuant to private ordering in the form of delegation of au-
thority by the Securities and Exchange Commission to—FASB 
in the case of corporate accounting146 and GASB in the case of 
government accounting.147
The Model Oversight Law first attempts to improve trans-
parency by improving balance-sheet disclosure of state SPE 
debt. Section III.1(b) of that Law requires each state SPE to 
maintain audited financial statements, certified by independ-
ent public accountants as complying with GASB’s generally ac-
cepted government accounting principles. It also requires each 
state SPE to deliver copies of these financial statements to the 
Authorities Oversight Office, an independent state government 
office created by the Model Oversight Law to oversee state 
SPEs. Subsection III.1(e) of that Law further requires each 
state SPE to establish a semi-independent audit committee to 
provide direct oversight of the accountants’ audits.  
  
The Model Oversight Law does not purport to question the 
government accounting principles promulgated by GASB. This 
Article suggests, however, that GASB should further examine 
how its accounting principles should treat balance-sheet disclo-
sure of state SPE debt. One important question, already dis-
cussed in this Article, is how to determine when such debt 
should be disclosed in the first instance.148
 
 146. See supra notes 
 A second question is 
how state SPE debt, otherwise required to be disclosed, should 
be disclosed—for example, as a liability on the state SPE’s bal-
ance sheet, in a separate column of the balance sheet as in-
debtedness of the state’s component units, or merely as a con-
129–30 and accompanying text; see also Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 320 (2002) (discussing this 
delegation of authority). 
 147. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.  
 148. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
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tingent liability shown in the notes to the balance sheet.149 Be-
cause few people actually read financial statement notes,150 
FASB has been struggling with a similar question in the con-
text of corporate accounting for SPE debt.151
The Model Oversight Law’s second approach to improving 
the transparency of state SPE debt is to consider mechanisms 
that go beyond accounting for such debt to be publicly disclosed. 
To this end, section II.1(e) of that Law requires the Authorities 
Oversight Office to assist state SPEs in improving the proce-
dures by which their finances are publicly disclosed, including 
standardizing disclosure of their liabilities. Standardized dis-
closure would help to facilitate comparative analysis. Section 
II.1(i) also requires the Authorities Oversight Office to periodi-
cally issue reports on its findings and analyses and, except to 
the extent proprietary, to make these reports and analyses pub-
licly available. 
  
2. Improving Monitoring of State SPE Debt 
Improved monitoring is a strong focus of the Model Over-
sight Law, which creates the Authorities Oversight Office to act 
as the primary monitor. Section III.1(c) of the Model Oversight 
Law requires each state SPE to inform the Authorities Over-
sight Office of its outstanding debt securities, the credit ratings 
on such debt, and any changes in those credit ratings. This en-
ables the Authorities Oversight Office not only to monitor that 
debt but also to publicly promulgate information about the debt 
(thereby also increasing transparency). 
Section II.1(h) of the Model Oversight Law requires the 
Authorities Oversight Office to monitor any defaults on state 
SPE debt and to find out how the defaults are resolved. Section 
III.1(d) of that Law ties back into that provision by requiring 
each state SPE itself to inform the Authorities Oversight Office 
of defaults on its debt and their resolution. By studying how de-
 
 149. A superficially simple solution would be to mandate balance-sheet dis-
closure of all state SPE debt, but that might have unintended consequences, 
such as undermining disclosure by making it too complex. Cf. Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (showing that excessive disclosure can undermine its 
comprehensibility). 
 150. See Annual CFO Survey, ASS'N GOV'T ACCOUNTANTS (July 2008), 
http://www.agacgfm.org/AGA/Documents/Research/cfosurvey2008-1-.pdf (sur-
veying CFOs and financial executives about the usefulness of financial state-
ments). 
 151. See supra note 131. 
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faults are resolved, the Authorities Oversight Office should be 
able to ascertain the extent to which the state itself, directly or 
indirectly, is supporting its SPEs. The Authorities Oversight 
Office would also be able to make this information publicly 
available. 
The Model Oversight Law further adopts a parallel track to 
ascertain the extent to which the state itself is supporting its 
SPEs. Section II.2(b) of that Law authorizes the Authorities 
Oversight Office to obtain, from any state government source, 
information and documentation revealing the existence and the 
nature of any direct or indirect guarantees backed by the 
state’s full faith and credit of state SPE debt. Section III.1(c) of 
that Law ties back into that authorization by requiring each 
state SPE itself to inform the Authorities Oversight Office of 
these guarantees.  
Finally, section III.1(g) of the Model Oversight Law con-
templates improved state SPE monitoring of its own debt. To 
this end, that Law requires each state SPE to establish a semi-
independent finance committee to review and make recommen-
dations on proposals by the SPE to issue debt. 
3. Limiting State SPE Debt 
To some extent, the finance committee requirement dis-
cussed above should help limit state SPE debt at appropriate 
levels. Section II.1(g) of the Model Oversight Law additionally 
requires the Authorities Oversight Office to make recommen-
dations to the state’s governor (and, as appropriate, the legisla-
ture) on setting state SPE debt limitations. To avoid the prob-
lem of these limits becoming obsolete over time, as has occurred 
at the state level with constitutional restrictions on bond 
debt,152
The extent to which state SPE debt should be limited will 
depend on various factors, including the extent to which such 
debt—and the extent to which state backstopping of such 
debt—can be transparently disclosed. The less transparent the 
disclosure, the more such debt should be limited. This suggests 
a potential conflict of interest: a state that is intent on non-
transparently backstopping its SPE debt might not want to fol-
low recommendations of the Authorities Oversight Office. In 
 section II.1(g) also requires the Authorities Oversight 
Office to update its recommendations over time.  
 
 152. See generally supra notes 26–28, 38–40 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing those constitutional restrictions). 
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the event of such a conflict, the only recourse of the Authorities 
Oversight Office may be to go public with its recommenda-
tions—an event that would require significant political will.  
4. Improving State SPE Governance 
The Model Oversight Law adopts several approaches to 
improving state SPE governance. These approaches seek to 
strengthen the accountability of state SPEs to state govern-
ment and, by extension, to the public, while also providing 
mechanisms for enforcement similar to those provided to corpo-
rate shareholders by Sarbanes-Oxley and to bondholders 
through corporate bond covenants. 
On a general level, section III.2(a) of the Model Oversight 
Law requires each state SPE to inform the Authorities Over-
sight Office of its governance structure. Subsections (c), (d), and 
(f) of section II.1 of that Law also require that Office to review 
and analyze the operations, practices, and reports of state 
SPEs, to assist state SPEs in improving their management 
practices, and to recommend to the state’s governor (and, as 
appropriate, the legislature) how to improve state SPE perfor-
mance. Subsections (c) and (d) of section III.2 require each state 
SPE to submit to the Authorities Oversight Office a multi-year 
financial plan as well as a mission statement setting forth the 
SPE’s purposes and goals, a description of its stakeholders (and 
the SPE’s understanding of their expectations), and a self-
evaluation. 
Section III.1(f) of the Model Oversight Law additionally 
requires each state SPE to self-examine its governance by es-
tablishing a semi-independent governance committee. This 
governance committee has the duty to review corporate govern-
ance trends, to keep the state SPE’s management informed of 
current best governance practices, to review and recommend 
any necessary or appropriate updates to the SPE’s governance, 
and to advise on the qualifications of the SPE’s management. 
The Model Oversight Law further attempts to limit con-
flicts of interest between state SPEs and their managers. To 
this end, section III.2(a) of that Law requires each state SPE to 
inform the Authorities Oversight Office of its conflict-of-
interest rules. Section III.1(f) of that Law also enables the gov-
ernance committee to examine and advise on conflict-of-interest 
issues. Additionally, section III.2(b) requires each state SPE to 
report to the Authorities Oversight Office the compensation 
and other benefits of each member of management whose com-
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bined compensation and benefits exceeds a threshold level. 
High compensation levels may well signal the potential for con-
flict.153
Finally, section II.2 of the Model Oversight Law imposes 
penalties on state SPEs and their managers that fail to comply 
with that Law’s requirements. The Authorities Oversight Office 
has the power to publicly warn and censure state SPEs for non-
compliance and to investigate complaints and issue any needed 
subpoenas. It also may request the state’s governor (and, as 
appropriate, the legislature) to suspend or dismiss members of 
state SPE management for cause.  
 
  CONCLUSION   
Like corporate special-purpose entities, or SPEs, which 
dominate the so-called “shadow banking” system,154 states in-
creasingly are using SPEs to create a vast shadow-financing 
network invisible to the public.155
For example, because state SPE debt is not technically a 
legal obligation of the state, states do not have to disclose that 
debt in their financial statements.
 The result is to reduce the 
transparency of public finance and to enable government offi-
cials to avoid public scrutiny.  
156
The resulting lack of transparency undermines the ability 
of the public to monitor state fiscal obligations, thereby mis-
leading investors and citizens as to the state’s real costs and in-
creasing the risk of systemic financial contagion. Ominously, 
the growing political pressure for debt reduction at the federal 
government level
 This lack of disclosure can 
nonetheless be misleading; states often have compelling eco-
nomic and reputational motivations to, and almost always do, 
stand behind that debt.  
157
 
 153. See supra note 
 is likely to exacerbate these effects by push-
137 and accompanying text.  
 154. See generally ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FRBNY STAFF REPORT NO. 458: 
SHADOW BANKING 4–5 (2010) (examining the economics of shadow banking); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, Inaugural Address at the 
Boston University Review of Banking & Financial Law Inaugural Symposium 
(Feb. 24, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1993185 (defining the 
shadow banking system). 
 155. Cf. AXELROD, supra note 75, at 13–15 (characterizing state SPEs as a 
form of “shadow” government). 
 156. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 157. See, e.g., THE NAT’L COMM’N OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, 
THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 6–7 (2010); Michael Sekora, How to Reduce the Na-
tional Debt Without Raising Taxes or Cutting Spending, ECONOMY IN CRISIS 
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ing even more of a financing burden onto states, in turn in-
creasing their incentives to issue debt through SPEs. 
The impact of this lack of transparency on public finance 
may well turn out to be worse than the impact of corporate SPE 
lack of transparency on corporate finance. Because states, un-
like corporations, cannot fail in the sense of being forced to liq-
uidate, they lack that deterrent against non-transparent use of 
SPEs. State public finance is also more susceptible than corpo-
rate finance to monitoring failures. Creditor monitoring of 
states and corporations is limited; shareholder monitoring 
helps fill that shortfall for corporations, but resident monitor-
ing is unlikely to fill that shortfall for states. Moreover, being 
an integral part of government, state SPEs that lack transpar-
ency can undermine not only the integrity of public finance but 
also constitutional and democratic legitimacy.  
A regulatory framework to govern the use of state SPEs is 
thus critically needed. This Article shows that any such frame-
work should embrace at least four overarching organizing prin-
ciples: improving transparency of state SPE debt, improving 
monitoring of state SPE debt, limiting state SPE debt, and im-
proving state SPE governance. Using these principles, the Arti-
cle proposes a Model Public Authorities Oversight Law and ex-
amines how it should apply to state SPEs and public finance, 
thereby enabling states to utilize the financing benefits of SPEs 
while controlling their hazards.  
  
 
(Jan. 22, 2011), http://economyincrisis.org/content/how-reduce-national-debt-
without-raising-taxes-or-cutting-spending; Stabilize the Debt, THE COMMITTEE 
FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET, http://crfb.org/stabilizethedebt/ (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2012). 
  
402 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:369 
 
  APPENDIX I   
 
  MODEL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES OVERSIGHT LAW158
 
   
I. AUTHORITIES OVERSIGHT OFFICE  
1. The Authorities Oversight Office is hereby established 
as an independent entity within the [Department of State].159
2. The Authorities Oversight Office shall perform the du-
ties and exercise the powers set forth in this Public Authorities 
Oversight Law [hereinafter, Oversight Law].  
 
3. The Authorities Oversight Office shall be governed by a 
Director, appointed by the Governor upon the advice and con-
sent of the [Legislature]. The Director shall hold office for a 
term of [____] years, subject to removal for cause by the Gover-
nor [upon the advice and consent of the Legislature]. The Di-
rector’s compensation shall be established by the Governor.  
4. The Director may appoint such officers, employees, and 
other agents and fix their compensation as the Director deems 
appropriate [subject to applicable civil service and other appro-
priate constraints, including State funding limitations and ad-
vice and consent of the Governor]. 
 
II. DUTIES AND POWERS OF THE AUTHORITIES OVERSIGHT OF-
FICE  
1. The Authorities Oversight Office shall have the duty to  
(a) develop a definition of State public authorities that are 
subject to this Oversight Law [hereinafter Authorities]; 
(b) develop and maintain a comprehensive list of Authori-
ties and their functions; 
(c) conduct reviews and analyses of the operations, practic-
es, and reports of Authorities;  
(d) assist Authorities in improving their management prac-
tices; 
 
 158. This Model Public Authorities Oversight Law, which is based in part 
on portions of New York State’s Public Authorities Reform Act of 2009, 2009 
N.Y. Laws ch. 506 is intended solely as a skeletal framework of regulation that 
could address the article’s four overarching organizing principles—improving 
transparency, improving monitoring, limiting debt, and improving governance. 
Like the article, the Model Oversight Law is focused on state SPEs. In princi-
ple, however, it could also be applied to SPEs established by municipalities or 
other non-state government units.  
 159. The Model Public Authorities Oversight Law does not purport to ad-
dress how the Authorities Oversight Office would be funded. 
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(e) assist Authorities in improving the procedures by which 
their activities and finances are publicly disclosed, including 
standardizing the content and format of their annual reports 
and standardizing disclosure of their liabilities;  
(f) make recommendations to the Governor [and the Legis-
lature] about improving the performance, reporting, organiza-
tion, and oversight of Authorities;  
(g) make recommendations to the Governor [and the Legis-
lature] on setting debt limitations for Authorities and on updat-
ing these limitations as appropriate; 
(h) monitor all defaults and all events [hereinafter incipi-
ent defaults] that with notice or lapse of time or both would be-
come defaults on debt issued by Authorities, and follow through 
to understand how such defaults and incipient defaults are re-
solved; 
(i) no later than [date] and annually thereafter, issue re-
ports on its findings and analyses to the Governor [and the Leg-
islature] and, promptly thereafter (except to the extent of any 
information or analysis therein that is proprietary), make such 
reports and analyses publicly available; and 
(j) provide such other information and analyses as may be 
reasonably requested by the Governor [or the Legislature]. 
2. The Authorities Oversight Office shall have the power to  
(a) request and receive from any Authority such infor-
mation, books, records, financial statements, other documenta-
tion, and assistance as may be necessary or appropriate to per-
form the Authorities Oversight Office’s duties;  
(b) request and receive from the State or any State agency 
or entity such information, documentation, and assistance as 
may be necessary or appropriate to ascertain the existence and 
nature of any direct or indirect guarantees of, or other assur-
ances of payment on, debt issued by Authorities, to the extent 
such guarantees or other assurances are directly or indirectly 
backed by the full faith and credit of the State;  
(c) enter into cooperative agreements with other govern-
ment offices to efficiently carry out its work and not duplicate 
resources;  
(d) investigate and act upon complaints or recommenda-
tions regarding any Authority, and issue subpoenas pertaining 
to such investigations;  
(e) establish and publish guidelines, and have the power 
based on such published guidelines, to publicly warn and cen-
sure Authorities for non-compliance with this Oversight Law; 
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(f) request the Governor [and, as needed, the Legislature] 
to suspend or dismiss members of management of Authorities 
for cause;  
(g) promulgate regulations to effectuate the purposes of 
this Oversight Law; and 
(h) do anything else necessary or appropriate to effectuate 
any of the foregoing. 
 
III. DUTIES OF AUTHORITIES 
1. Each Authority shall have the duty to  
(a) cooperate with the Authorities Oversight Office as con-
templated by this Oversight Law, including (without limiting 
the other obligations listed below) providing such information, 
books, records, other documentation, and assistance as re-
quested in accordance therewith; 
(b) maintain audited financial statements, certified by in-
dependent public accountants as complying with generally ac-
cepted government accounting principles, and deliver copies of 
such audited financial statements to the Authorities Oversight 
Office; 
(c) inform the Authorities Oversight Office of all outstand-
ing debt securities, including (i) the ratings by credit rating 
agencies on such debt securities and, promptly after it occurs, 
any change in such ratings, and (ii) any direct or indirect guar-
antees of, or other assurances of payment on, such debt securi-
ties, to the extent such guarantees or other assurances are di-
rectly or indirectly backed by the full faith and credit of the 
State; 
(d) inform the Authorities Oversight Office of all defaults 
and incipient defaults on its debt and of how such defaults and 
incipient defaults are resolved; 
(e) establish an audit committee, with at least [____] inde-
pendent members [who shall constitute a majority of the audit 
committee, and] who shall possess the necessary skills to un-
derstand the duties and functions of the audit committee; the 
audit committee shall recommend to the Authority’s manage-
ment the hiring of an independent public accounting firm, shall 
set the compensation to be paid to such firm, and shall provide 
direct oversight of the performance of the audits performed by 
such firm;  
(f) establish a governance committee, with at least [____] 
independent members [who shall constitute a majority of the 
governance committee, and] who shall possess the necessary 
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skills to understand the duties and functions of the governance 
committee; the governance committee shall keep the Authori-
ty’s management informed of current best governance practic-
es, shall review corporate governance trends, shall review and 
recommend any necessary or appropriate updates to the Au-
thority’s governance, shall advise on the skills and experiences 
required of members of the Authority’s management, and shall 
examine and advise on ethics and conflict-of-interest issues; 
and 
(g) if and when the Authority issues debt or has debt out-
standing, establish a finance committee, with at least [____] in-
dependent members [who shall constitute a majority of the fi-
nance committee, and] who shall possess the necessary skills to 
understand the duties and functions of the finance committee; 
the finance committee shall review and make recommendations 
on proposals for the issuance of debt by the Authority. 
2. No later than [date] and annually thereafter, each Au-
thority shall also have the duty to provide to the Authorities 
Oversight Office  
(a) a description of the Authority, its activities undertaken 
during the past year, its governance structure, its code of eth-
ics, its conflict-of-interest rules, and (from time to time prompt-
ly after it occurs) any change to any of the foregoing; 
(b) a listing of the compensation and other benefits, direct 
and indirect, of each officer, director, other member of man-
agement, employee, and agent of the Authority making com-
pensation and benefits aggregating in excess of $[________]; 
(c) a mission statement setting forth the purposes and 
goals of the Authority, a description of the Authority’s stake-
holders and the Authority’s understanding of their expecta-
tions, a set of criteria by which performance of the Authority 
and achievement of its goals may be evaluated, and a self-
evaluation based on those criteria; and  
(d) a [____]-year financial plan, including a current and 
projected capital budget and an operating budget report.  
3. Notwithstanding sections III.1 and III.2 above, the Au-
thorities Oversight Office may, upon application of any Author-
ity, waive any requirement listed in those sections upon a 
showing that the Authority meets the criteria for such a waiv-
er. Such criteria shall be established by regulations issued by 
the Authorities Oversight Office with the advice and consent of 
the Governor [and the Legislature], taking into account (among 
other factors) the relevance of the requirement to evaluation of 
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the Authority’s effective operation and the burden such re-
quirement places on the Authority. Each waiver so granted 
shall be disclosed in the applicable report of the Authorities 
Oversight Office issued pursuant to section II.1(i) of this Over-
sight Law. 
